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To our knowledge, this paper provides the most comprehensive analysis of firm-level corporate income
tax expenses to date.  We use publicly available financial statement information to estimate firm-level
effective tax rates (ETRs) for 10,642 corporations from 85 countries from 1988 to 2007.  We find
that multinationals and domestic-only companies face similar ETRs.  We also find that, on average,
ETRs declined by seven percentage points or 20% over the period.  German, Japanese, Australian
and Canadian decreases were large.  American, British, and French declines were more modest.  Nonetheless,
because ETRs were falling worldwide, the ordinal rank from high-tax countries to low-tax countries
changed little.  Japanese firms always faced the highest ETRs.  ETRs for tax havens and countries
from the Middle East and Asia (ignoring Japan) were always lower than those for the U.S. and European
countries.  These findings should provide some empirical underpinning for ongoing policy debates
about the taxation of multinational profits.
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This paper estimates country-level effective tax rates (ETRs) using financial statement 
information from 10,642 corporations domiciled in 85 countries and having subsidiaries in 195 
countries from 1988 to 2007.
1
The purpose of this study is to illuminate an ongoing worldwide debate about the taxation 
of international commerce.  At the beginning of our investigation period (1988), the taxation of 
multinationals was an obscure area of the law, understood by few practitioners, rarely mentioned 
in policy circles, and largely ignored by academe.  Today, globalization has made the taxation of 
international commerce relevant to most businesses, central to policy discussions about jobs, 
trade, and competitiveness, and an area of interest to scholars in accounting, economics, finance, 
law, and related fields.   
  These ETRs enable us to compare within and across countries the 
taxes faced by multinationals and domestic-only firms and to assess the extent to which the 
domicile of foreign subsidiaries affects the worldwide tax expense of multinationals.  Tests are 
conducted across years and industries.   
International tax policy changes are being proposed and implemented around the globe.  
In December, 2008, the UK and Japan decided to revamp their international tax law by shifting 
from a worldwide tax system to a territorial tax system.
2
                                                           
1 By “domicile,” we mean the location of the firm for tax purposes.  There is no standard definition of domicile.  For 
example, domicile is the legal residence or site of incorporation in the U.S., but the location of operational 
headquarters in the UK. 
  In the same month, an advisory panel 
formed by the Canadian Minister of Finance recommended multinational-friendly changes to its 
international tax law (see Advisory Panel on Canada’s System of International Taxation, 2008).  
2 In overly simplistic terms, countries with territorial systems only tax the domestic income of companies domiciled 
in their country.  In contrast, countries with worldwide systems tax all income (domestic and foreign) of their home 
companies and provide foreign tax credits to prevent double taxation of foreign profits. 2 
 
All three countries claimed to be attempting to enhance the competitiveness of their 
multinationals.   
In May, 2009, the Obama Administration took a different course, proposing controversial 
changes that would strengthen the U.S. worldwide tax system.  These proposals follow years of 
debate over whether longstanding American policy toward the taxation of international business 
is in the best interest of the country (see United States House of Representatives (2007), Clausing 
and Avi-Yonah (2007), and The President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (2005), 
among many others).   
This paper examines tax information from the financial statements to provide some 
empirical underpinning for these important policy discussions.  Although we recognize that 
numerous economic, social, and political forces have motivated the need for this documentation, 
it is beyond the scope of this paper to list the many changes in investment, technology, trade, and 
labor that have accelerated the development of a global economy and exacerbated the inherent 
difficulty that any single government faces in attempting to tax companies that service these 
multinational markets.  Furthermore, it also is beyond the scope of this paper to detail how 
countries have revised their tax laws in recent years to continue to collect revenue while 
maintaining or increasing their share of the global economy, to list the numerous tax plans 
devised in response to these legislative changes, to discuss the difficulties of communicating this 
complex area of tax law in the political arena, or to review the literature of international tax 
research in accounting, economics, finance and law.  Instead, we will mention a few recent 
events concerning the taxation of multinationals that should suffice for demonstrating the 
current, unprecedented interest in multinational taxation and the contribution that this study 3 
 
makes in providing some empirical facts about the extent to which the domicile of a company 
affects the taxes that it pays.    
To start, U.S. President Barack Obama ran on a tax plan that included “…reforming 
deferral to end the incentive for companies to ship jobs overseas.” 
(http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/taxes/Factsheet_Tax_Plan_FINAL.pdf).  His election spurred 
months of heated debate about the possible elimination of the deferral of U.S. taxes on foreign 
profits until dividend repatriation (Weiner, 2009).
3  On May 4, 2009, when the White House put 
forth a formal proposal, which calls for deferring some deductions until repatriation and curbing 
the “check the box” regulations that enable multinationals to structure their foreign operations in 
a tax-favorable manner, President Obama justified the changes, saying “I want to see our 
companies remain the most competitive in the world.  But the way to make sure that happens is 
not to reward our companies for moving jobs off our shores or transferring profits to overseas tax 
havens.”  Ignoring the merits of the controversial proposed changes, Obama-type policy 
statements imply that multinationals somehow benefit unfairly from a tax system with perverse 
incentives.
4
In contrast, the managers of many U.S. multinationals assert that the U.S. tax system 
places them at a competitive disadvantage compared with multinationals in other countries.  
 
                                                           
3 A major cost of repealing deferral for some companies would be the deleterious impact on book income.  Under 
current tax law, APB 23 permits firms to classify foreign profits as permanently reinvested, which enables them to 
report no deferred income taxes for any possible U.S. taxes to be paid at repatriation.  Repealing deferral would 
render this discretion under APB 23 irrelevant.  This possibility led Ralph Hellmann, lead lobbyist for the 
Information Technology Industry Council, to state that the benefit of APB 23 deferral “…hits the bottom line of 
companies more than any other issue right now.  We have to defeat it [repeal of deferral].” (Drucker, 2009).   
4 Consistent with U.S. multinationals’ exploiting their ability to report profits in locations with more favorable tax 
systems than the U.S., the foreign affiliates of American companies reported more of their aggregate net income in 
the Netherlands (13%), Luxembourg (8%), and Bermuda (8%) than any country in 2006 
(http://www.bea.gov/international/di1usdop.htm).  Other locations with profits that far exceeded assets, sales and 
employees were Ireland (7%), Switzerland (6%), Singapore (4%), and UK islands in the Caribbean (3%).  For 
comparison, 7% of the aggregate net income of U.S. foreign affiliates was reported to Canada (the U.S. largest 
trading partner) and the UK, while only 2% was reported in Japan and Germany, which are considered among the 
most highly-taxed countries. 4 
 
They point to the relatively high U.S. statutory tax rate as evidence of the competitive 
disadvantage.
5
Meanwhile, during much of 2008, British firms were not just complaining about the tax 
system, they were abandoning it for domiciles with more favorable tax treatment (The 
Economist, 2008).  The Henderson Group, Charter, Shire, WPP, and the United Business Media 
emigrated to Ireland and the Regus Group to Luxembourg reportedly to escape high taxes on 
foreign profits for multinationals domiciled in the UK (Werdigier, 2008 and Faith, 2008).  
Kingfisher, Brit Insurance, RSA Insurance, and Prudential, among others, threatened to leave 
(Werdigier, 2008, Braithwaite, 2008).  In fact, the Financial Times (September 21, 2008) quoted 
an anonymous source saying, “As we understand it, half the FTSE 100 is looking at this 
[redomiciling outside the UK.].” (Braithwaite, 2008). 
  They call for reform of the U.S. taxation of multinational profits to reflect current 
global business conditions, although no consensus exists in the business community about the 
changes that should be made.  Furthermore, consistent with claims that companies domiciled 
outside the U.S. enjoy more favorable tax conditions (at least for their American operations), the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office (2008) recently concluded that U.S. companies owned 
by foreigners pay less U.S. tax than do U.S. companies controlled by Americans.     
One of those exited British firms is Invesco, which moved its domicile to Bermuda (a tax 
haven) in December 2007.  It was explicit about the influence of international tax considerations.  
Although the S&P 500 company is headquartered in Atlanta, it moved its domicile to Bermuda, 
                                                           
5 In the September 26, 2008, U.S. Presidential debate, Republican Presidential candidate Senator John McCain 
expressed these views about statutory tax rates, stating “Right now,  American business pays the second-highest 
business taxes in the world, 35 percent. Ireland pays 11 percent.  Now, if you're a business person, and you can 
locate any place in the world, then, obviously, if you go to the country where it's 11 percent tax versus 35 percent, 
you're going to be able to create jobs, increase your business, make more investment, et cetera.  I want to cut that 
business tax. I want to cut it so that businesses will remain in—in the United States of America and create jobs.”  
His opponent, Senator Barack Obama, countered, “Now, John mentioned the fact that business taxes on paper are 
high in this country, and he's absolutely right. Here's the problem: There are so many loopholes that have been 
written into the tax code, oftentimes with support of Senator McCain, that we actually see our businesses pay 
effectively one of the lowest tax rates in the world.” 5 
 
rather than the U.S.  According to Invesco’s Chief Administrative Officer, Colin Meadows, 
“…we wanted to make sure the transaction in moving our domicile was tax neutral for our 
shareholders.  Moving to the U.S. would not have been a tax neutral situation. When it came 
down to it, it was a very short list of places that we considered and Bermuda was at the top.” 
(Neil, 2007).
6
The recent British departures may be receiving undue attention in the same way that a 
few American inversions (reincorporations in low-tax countries with no operational impact) 
several years ago became highly controversial (in particular, Stanley Works’ aborted move to 
Bermuda in 2002).
    
7  The more significant losses (both in number and pounds) may be those 
newly formed companies that in the past would have established their headquarters in the UK but 
instead are domiciling (for tax purposes) outside the UK from their inception.  Since these 
“departures” are unobservable, they mainly escape attention, though their impact may be larger 
and longer-lasting.  Furthermore, some companies already domiciled in (perceived to be) tax-
disfavored countries, such as the UK and the U.S., claim that they wish that they had never 
incorporated there and would leave, except for the high tax, political and other costs of exiting.
8
                                                           
6 Interestingly, Invesco has 5,500 employees in 19 countries, but neither office nor employees in Bermuda.  Desai 
(2008) discusses this increasingly common separation of a multinational’s headquarters, tax domicile, and 
operations, which he terms the decentering of the global firm.  In this paper, we may miscode a country’s domicile 
(i.e., tax home) if its domicile differs from the location provided in the company’s financial records.  
     
7 See Desai and Hines (2002) and Voget (2008) for detailed discussions of inversions.  Capturing the fiery rhetoric 
in 2002 concerning U.S. inversions, Johnston (2002) reported, “Senior senators from both parties used blunt 
language today to denounce companies that use Bermuda as a mail drop to reduce their American income taxes by 
tens of millions of dollars, calling them ‘greedy’ and ‘unpatriotic’ tax evaders whose actions could not be tolerated 
‘in a time of war’.” 
8 Their ongoing dissatisfaction is reminiscent of the testimony of Bob Perlman, Vice President of Taxes for Intel 
Corporation, before the Senate Finance Committee in March, 1999, where he stated, “…if I had known at Intel's 
founding (over thirty years ago) what I know today about the international tax rules, I would have advised that the 
parent company be established outside the U.S. This reflects the reality that our Tax Code competitively 
disadvantages multinationals simply because the parent is a U.S. corporation.” (Perlman, 1999).  Indicative of the 
heated nature of this topic, the Senate Finance Committee's ranking Democrat, New York Senator Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan retorted, "So, you would have left the United States for the tax shelters of the Cayman Islands.  Do you 
think that the Marines are still down there if you need them?...So money matters more to you than country?...I am 
sure you will reconsider it, but if you do move, well, just keep in check with the American consul.  You might never 
know." (United States Senate Committee on Finance, 1999, p.17.) 6 
 
Not all developed countries host unhappy multinationals.  Dutch multinationals, 
particularly following enactment of the 2007 Corporate Income Tax Law, reportedly are paying 
little, if any, tax.  Of the twenty largest Dutch companies, allegedly fewer than five are paying 
any corporate income tax to the Netherlands (Dohmen, 2008).  Consistent with favorable 
treatment of Dutch multinationals, one international tax expert, Timothy McDonald, Vice 
President of Finance and Accounting for Procter & Gamble, recently identified the Netherlands 
as having the model system for taxing multinationals (Tuerff, et al., 2008, p.79). 
Other countries have recently followed the Dutch lead.  In late 2008, both the British and 
Japanese governments moved to exempt dividends paid from foreign subsidiaries from home 
country corporate income taxes.  The changes shift both countries from a worldwide system of 
taxation to a territorial system, leaving the U.S. as the only major country with a worldwide 
system.  
In the UK case, the Treasury stated that “The policy objective is to enhance the 
competitiveness of the UK by providing the widest possible exemption.”  Chris Morgan of 
KPMG called the proposal, “…a decisive shift towards a territorial tax system where the UK 
only taxes profits made in the UK.”  However, Ian Brimicombe, head of tax at AstraZeneca, 
doubted that the change in the law would bring back the firms that had already exited the UK and 
noted that companies with intellectual property or finance subsidiaries were still disadvantaged 
in the UK. (Houlder, 2008).  Nonetheless, UK multinationals widely welcomed the exemption of 
foreign dividends.      
Favorable tax treatment for multinationals inevitably leads to concerns that smaller 
domestic firms are paying a disproportionate share of the taxes.  For example, after the HM 
Revenue and Customs National Audit Office (2007) reported that a third of the UK’s 700 largest 7 
 
companies paid no tax in the 2005-2006 financial year, Bill Dodwell of Deloitte stated, “That 
700 of the largest companies and groups are only paying 54 per cent of corporation tax shows the 
giant contribution of small companies.  It is probably because many are less international and so 
have different planning opportunities.” (Houlder, 2007).  With regards to U.S. companies, 
Johnston (2008) agrees, stating that “…very few grasp how corporate taxes favor multinationals 
over domestic firms.”   
Now we have come full circle.  Perceptions that multinationals are not paying their fair 
share of taxes because they can avail themselves of tax planning opportunities not available to 
smaller firms fuel calls for policy changes, such as those recently proposed by the White House.  
As this smattering of recent events shows, the taxation of multinationals is controversial and 
politically charged with implications for a country’s ability to compete for tax revenue, capital, 
investment, and labor.
9
To estimate the corporate income taxes paid by multinationals and domestics around the 
globe, we regress firm-level ETRs on categorical variables for the domicile of the parent and 
whether the company is a multinational.  The regression coefficients on the categorical variables 
provide estimates of country-level ETRs for both domestic firms, i.e., those operating in the 
home country only, and multinationals, i.e., those domiciled in the home country but operating in 
at least one other country.  These ETR estimates enable us to compare domestics with 
multinationals, both within countries and across countries, industries, and years.  We then 
conduct similar regressions adding categorical variables that denote the location of the firm’s 
  This paper aims to provide facts for the ongoing debate by estimating 
worldwide taxes using the ETRs for domestic-only firms, multinationals, and foreign 
subsidiaries around the globe and over many years.   
                                                           
9 A recent example of the intensity surrounding the taxation of multinationals is the threat by French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy to walk out of the April 2009 G20 meeting if the China objected to a listing of non-compliant tax 
havens. 8 
 
foreign subsidiaries.  These tests enable us to compare the tax expenses attributable to foreign 
subsidiaries.   
We find that multinationals and domestic firms have similar ETRs.  Japanese firms 
always face the highest tax rates.  The ETRs for companies in tax havens, the Middle East and 
Asia (setting aside Japan) are always lower than those for firms domiciled in the U.S. and 
Europe.  We also find a worldwide decline in ETRs.  From 1989 to 2006, ETRs, on average, 
dropped seven percentage points or 20%.  German, Japanese, Australian, and Canadian ETRs 
decreased more than American, British, and French ETRs did.  Nevertheless, because the ETRs 
were falling for all countries, the ordinal rank from high-tax countries to low-tax countries 
changed little.  We also find evidence that the location of a foreign subsidiary may have some 
effect, though limited, on a multinational’s worldwide tax burden. 
To our knowledge, this paper provides the most comprehensive analysis of international 
firm-level corporate income tax burdens to date.  Collins and Shackelford (1995) studied parent 
ETRs for four countries (Canada, Japan, the UK, and the U.S.) and ten years (1982-1991).  Their 
subsequent study, Collins and Shackelford (2003), added Germany and investigated ETRs from 
1992-1997; however, with data for only eight Japanese firm-years and 36 German firm-years, 
they were effectively limited to studying three countries.  In both studies, they conclude that the 
parents of multinationals domiciled in the U.S. and the UK faced similar ETRs, both of which 
exceeded the parent ETRs in Canada.  In neither study did they have information about the 
location of the company’s subsidiaries.  Recent advances in computer-readable financial 
statement datasets enable us to study far more companies (both at the parent and subsidiary 
level), countries, and years than Collins and Shackelford could study.   9 
 
Two other studies have compared ETRs across countries.  Lu and Swenson (2000) and 
Lee and Swenson (2008) document average ETRs for a wide range of countries for 1995-1998 
and 2006-2007, respectively.  Using the Global Vantage and Compustat Global databases, they 
calculate country-level ETRs and use them as a basis for comparison for the Asia-Pacific 
countries that were the focus of their studies.  Neither study separates domestic-only and 
multinational corporations or has information on the location of firms’ subsidiaries.  As a result, 
inferences in both studies are limited to cross-country comparisons at the aggregate and industry 
levels.   
A concurrent study with access to more U.S. companies than our study is Dyreng and 
Lindsey (2009).  They use text-searching software to collect foreign operations information for 
all U.S.-incorporated firms in the Compustat database between 1995 and 2007 and estimate the 
average worldwide, federal, and foreign tax rates on U.S. pre-tax income.  A limitation of their 
study is that they do not have access to data for companies domiciled outside the U.S.  In 
contrast, our access to financial statement information for thousands of firms from scores of 
countries enables us to substantially expand the understanding of corporate tax burdens around 
the world.  While our findings cannot identify the appropriate international tax policy, the ETR 
estimates in this study should prove useful quantitative information as policymakers, business, 
and scholars around the globe grapple with the complexities surrounding the taxation of 
multinational activities. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the regression equation used to 
estimate the ETRs.  Section 3 details the sample selection.  Sections 4, 5, and 6 present the 
empirical findings.  Closing remarks follow. 
 10 
 
2.  Regression Equation 
To compare the tax rates of multinationals and domestic firms across countries and to 
determine whether multinationals and domestics in the same country face different tax rates, we 
estimate a modified version of the pooled, cross-sectional regression equation developed in 






where:   the effective tax rate for firm i in year t. 
   an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i is domiciled in country j in year 
t, equal to 0 otherwise. 
   an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i has a foreign subsidiary in year 
t, equal to 0 otherwise. 
   an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i is identified as being in 
industry k (by two-digit NAICS) in year t, equal to 0 otherwise. 
   an indicator variable equal to 1 for firm-years for which t = m, equal to 
0 otherwise. 
   the percentile rank of the size of variable n for firm i in year t. 
n={Assets, Revenue, Owners’ Equity}. 
We suppress the intercept so that the coefficients on the COUNTRY variables can be 
interpreted as the marginal cost of domiciling in a country, i.e., the effective tax rate for domestic 
                                                           
10 Collins and Shackelford’s (1995) regression model includes categorical variables indicating whether the firm’s 
income statement is consolidated or restated in accordance with U.S. GAAP.  We exclude all unconsolidated firm-
years from our sample to avoid potentially including both parents and their subsidiaries as separate observations.  
We cannot include the restatement variable because our data do not include it. 11 
 
firms.
11  Throughout the paper, we refer to the coefficient on the COUNTRY variable as the 
domestic ETR.  Suppressing the intercept also means that the coefficient on the COUNTRY*MN 
variables is the incremental tax cost for multinationals (as compared with the domestics) in that 
country.  We test whether this coefficient is significantly different from zero.  Positive values are 
consistent with multinationals in a country facing higher ETRs than their domestic counterparts 
face.  Negative values are consistent with domestics in a country facing higher ETRs than their 
multinational counterparts face.  Throughout the paper, we refer to the sum of the coefficients on 
the COUNTRY and the COUNTRY * MN variables as the multinational ETR.
12
The coefficients on INDUSTRY and YEAR are used to determine whether ETRs vary 
across industries and time.  Since Rego (2003) finds that ETRs are increasing in the size of the 
firm, we include three control variables for size (SIZE): the percentile ranks of Total Assets, 
Revenues, and Equity.
   
13
The ETRs are collected from each firm’s financial statements.
 
14
                                                           
11 To estimate equation (1), one industry and one year have to be excluded from the regression.  To determine which 
industry to leave out, we calculate the mean ETR in each industry (two-digit NAICS) and then determine the median 
of those means.  The industry with the median mean (code 31) is the one left out.  We implement a similar 
procedure on the years, resulting in 2005 being the excluded year.  To improve comparability across estimations, we 
exclude the same industry and year from each regression. 
  The numerator for the 
ETR computation is the total worldwide income tax expense in the company’s publicly available 
financial statements.  In subsequent tests, the numerator is current income tax expense.  
12 Note that the magnitude of the domestic and multinational ETRs cannot be directly compared with the actual 
ETRs from the financial statements, which serve as the dependent variable.  The domestic and multinational ETRs 
are the tax rates, conditional on industry, year, and size.  That said, our empirical analysis shows that the estimated 
ETRs are very similar to the actual ETRs from the financial statements. 
13 We use percentile ranks rather than actual values or logarithms to mitigate concerns about the accuracy of the 
foreign exchange and unit data.  We converted all dollar variables to millions of U.S. dollars using the currency and 
unit data in the database.  However, there appear to be errors in the data for a few countries, e.g., some of the Italian 
data, which the database claims is expressed in Euros, appear to be expressed in Italian Lira.  Also in a few cases, 
data appear to be expressed in thousands although the database asserts that they are expressed in millions.  By using 
percentile ranks, we limit the impact of these possible errors on our size controls. 
14 Note that the ETRs in this study are not marginal tax rates, as detailed in Scholes, et al., 2009.  They ignore 
implicit taxes, cannot assess who bears the burden of corporate income taxes, and cannot capture incentives to 
employ new capital (see Fullerton, 1980, and Bradford and Fullerton, 1981, for a discussion of marginal effective 
tax rates). Neither are they the tax rates related to investment decisions developed in Devereux and Griffith (1998) 
and Gordon, et al (2003).  12 
 
Unfortunately, unlike U.S. GAAP, the GAAP in many countries do not require firms to disclose 
the current income tax expense.  Thus, many companies in our study do not report their current 
income tax expense.  Nonetheless, for those companies that report both figures, inferences are 
the same whether we use total or current income tax expense.  Thus, to conduct our primary 
tests, we use the total income tax expense because it is available for more firms.   
The ETR denominator is net income before income taxes (NIBT).  Since financial 
reporting rules vary across countries and thus affect the computation of NIBT, we conduct 
sensitivity tests using total revenues and an adjusted net income as denominators.
15
 
  Results are 
qualitatively the same. 
3.  Sample 
We use the Osiris database to collect a sample of firms for this study.
16  To collect 
information about the parents for all firm-years between 1988 and 2007, we access the data 
through the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) interface.
17
                                                           
15 To test the sensitivity of our findings to the selection of NIBT as the scalar, we use two other profit measures to 
scale the total income tax expense: adjusted net income (NIBT plus certain key expenses) and revenues.  Adjusted 
net income is intended to add back two key expenses whose accounting rules vary across countries, namely 
depreciation expense and research and development expense.  The second scalar, revenues, eliminates any cross-
country variation in expenses.   
  We attempt to mitigate the 
impact of outliers and errors in the data by deleting all observations for which any one of the 
following are true: (a) ETR exceeds 70%, (b) ETR is negative, (c) the ratio of total income tax 
expense to a modification of NIBT (adding back depreciation and research and development 
16 Although the number of financial statement variables tracked in Osiris is smaller than that tracked in Compustat 
Global, the Osiris database is superior for this study because it allows us to identify the countries in which firms 
have subsidiaries. 
17 The data used in this study were last updated February 13, 2008.  Because very few December year-end firms 
would have reported by that time, the number of observations for 2007 is smaller than those for the earlier years. 13 
 
expense) is negative or exceeds 70%.
18
Information about the subsidiaries of these firms is accessed through an Internet interface 
with Bureau van Dijk.
  We also eliminate firm-years with (a) missing values for 
firm identifier (os_id_number), sales (data13002), tax expense (data13035), and NIBT 
(data13034), (b) nonpositive sales, and (c) negative values for depreciation, and research and 
development expenses.  All missing values for depreciation and research and development 
expense are set to zero.  We also delete all observations where NIBT plus depreciation and 
research and development expense equals zero. 
19  We obtain information about subsidiaries classified in levels 1 through 
10.
20  Thus, if a firm has a domestic subsidiary (level 1), which has a domestic subsidiary (level 
2), which has a domestic subsidiary (level 3) and so forth until the domestic subsidiary in level 9 
has a foreign subsidiary (level 10), we would treat that firm as a multinational and code that 
country as having a foreign subsidiary.  Foreign subsidiaries buried beneath ten layers of 
domestic subsidiaries will be miscoded, but we doubt that this data limitation will have any 
effect on the paper’s inferences.
21
The Osiris subsidiary measure has a serious flaw.  Osiris only reports the subsidiary 
information as of the most recent updating of the information.
 
22
                                                           
18 Inferences are unchanged when we further control for the effects of outliers by deleting from each specification 
any observations that are identified as outliers by Cook’s D, studentized residuals, or DFFITS.  
  We are unable to assess the 
19 Bureau van Dijk collects information directly from Annual Reports and other filings.  In addition, it obtains 
information from several information providers, including CFI Online (Ireland), Dun & Bradstreet, Datamonitor, 
Factset, LexisNexis, and Worldbox. 
20 Over two-thirds of the firms reported having zero subsidiaries.  We crosschecked this information to public filings 
of a sample of Canadian and U.S. firms and determined that several of these firms had subsidiaries.  Because 
accurate identification of domestic and multinational firms is central to our study, we discarded the subsidiary 
information of the 28,427 parent firms that reported having zero subsidiaries.  We then code any firm that reports at 
least one foreign subsidiary as multinational and those that report zero foreign subsidiaries as domestic.   
21 We obtain subsidiary information up to level 10 for parents domiciled everywhere, except Canada, New York, 
and North Carolina.  For unresolved reasons, we were only able to obtain level 1 subsidiary information for firms 
domiciled in these jurisdictions.  Inferences are unchanged when we drop firm-years from these jurisdictions from 
our sample. 
22 For example, if a company had no subsidiary in Canada before 2007 (the most recent year in the database) and 
then incorporated a subsidiary in Canada in 2007, we would erroneously treat the company as having had a 14 
 
extent to which this data limitation affects the conclusions drawn from this study.  However, to 
mitigate the potential for miscoding the existence and location of foreign subsidiaries, we limit 
the primary tests in this paper to firm-years since 2002.
23
Our sample selection process yields a main sample of 27,136 firm-years spanning 85 
countries, ranging from only one firm-year in seven countries to 7,177 in the U.S.  We combine 
the countries with the fewest observations based on geography and other characteristics, leaving 
nine large countries: Australia
  Our logic is that the foreign subsidiary 
coding is correct for 2007, has fewer errors in 2006 than in 2005, and has fewer errors in 2005 
than in 2004, and so forth.  We arbitrarily select the last five years for which we have data as the 
cut-off for our primary tests in the hope that the miscoding is of an acceptable level for these 
most recent years.  In subsequent tests, we present estimated coefficients from one regression 
that uses all of the firm-years and from annual regressions for each year.  Conclusions are similar 
regardless of the sample period.         
24 (5% of the sample), Canada (3%), China (3%), France (1%), 
Germany (1%), India (2%), Japan (24%), the UK (8%) and the U.S.(26%).
25
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Canadian subsidiary for all years in our sample.  Likewise, if a company had a subsidiary in Canada for all years 
before 2007 and then liquidated the Canadian subsidiary in 2006, we would erroneously treat the company as not 
having had a subsidiary in Canada for any year in our sample.   
  Because of a 
similar history of economic development, we form a group with the four Asian Tigers (Hong 
Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan—12% of the sample).  We form another group 
23 Another advantage of limiting the analysis to recent years is that it mitigates potential survivorship bias.  The 
Osiris database is limited to companies presently in existence.  Thus, our analysis is limited to firms that have 
survived throughout the investigation period.  By restricting the sample to firm-years since 2002, we reduce the 
deleterious effects of survivorship bias. 
24 We include New Zealand with Australia because New Zealand does not fit in any of the geographic groups 
described below, does not meet the criteria to be included on its own, and the corporate income tax systems of the 
two countries are largely similar.  In our main sample, we have 1,138 Australia parent firm-years and 96 New 
Zealand parent firm-years. 
25 The large countries were selected based on the size of their economy and the number of their firm-years.  These 
nine countries were the only ones with gross domestic product in excess of one trillion dollars in 2008 (per the CIA 
World Factbook) and at least 200 firm-years in the sample. 15 
 
comprised of 17 Tax Havens (3% of the sample).
26  The remaining 57 countries are organized 
geographically into five groups: Africa (1% of the sample), Asia (2%), Europe (6%), the Middle 
East (2%) and Latin America (2%).
27  All of the tests are conducted and results are reported 
using these 16 countries and groups.
28
For the 16 countries and groups, Table 1 reports the firm-year means of Sales, Assets, 




The final four columns of Table 1 present summary measures of alternative tax rate 
measures (all expressed in percentages).  In the first of the four columns (“Agg ETR”), the 
numerator is the aggregated tax expense for all firms in a group (e.g., all American companies) 
divided by the aggregated NIBT for those firms.  In the full sample, both domestics and 
multinationals have aggregate ETRs of 31%.  The next column presents the means of the total 
income tax expense divided by net income before taxes.  These are the actual ETRs from the 
  Not surprisingly, multinational firms average more sales, assets, 
equity, total tax expense and NIBT than domestics do.  The next two columns in Table 1 show 
the average number of subsidiaries (domestic and foreign) and the average number of 
subsidiaries located in foreign countries, respectively.  
                                                           
26 Note that though they classify Hong Kong and Singapore as tax havens, we do not include them in the tax haven 
group but rather as members of the Asian Tiger group.  However, inferences are unaltered if we include Hong Kong 
and Singapore in the Tax Havens group and leave South Korea and Taiwan as the only countries in the Asian Tiger 
group.  
27 No countries are included twice in the groupings.  For example, the Asia group only includes Asian countries not 
included in other places.  Thus, it does not include China, India, Japan, and the Asian Tigers because they are 
reported separately. 
28 In sensitivity tests, we further divide the Europe group into former Warsaw Pact countries and all other countries.  
Inferences are unchanged.  Because we have fewer than 200 firm-years for the Warsaw Pact group in our main 
sample, we present the results for the aggregated group only. 
29 Osiris asserts that its data are recorded in local currency and provides a variable indicating an appropriate 
exchange rate for conversion to U.S. dollars and a variable indicating the units in which the data are expressed.  
However, some unusually large numbers for a few countries, particularly Italy and Mexico, suggest that at least 
some of the figures are stated in a currency different from the one indicated or in units different from the ones 
indicated.  Since our regression measures are scaled, we doubt that any variation in currency should affect our 
conclusions.  Consistent with that expectation, inferences are unaltered when all Italian and Mexican observations 
are deleted from the study. 16 
 
firms’ financial statements, not ETRs estimated from regression analysis.  The domestics 
(multinationals) have mean ETRs of 30% (28%).  The penultimate column reports the median 
ETRs. Domestics (multinationals) have median ETRs of 32% (30%).  The final column presents 
the average statutory tax rate for the country-years in the sample.
30
In general, the four tax rate columns paint a similar picture.  Countries with high statutory 
tax rates tend to have high ETR, whether they are measured in the aggregate or at the firm level.  
One notable exception is multinationals domiciled in tax havens.  They face the lowest statutory 
rates in the study.  However, their ETRs are much higher, albeit less than those in most other 
countries.  This discrepancy between statutory and effective tax rates is consistent with 
multinationals in tax havens having extensive foreign operations in high-tax countries.  Even 
though they face low taxes on their domestic income, they must pay higher taxes abroad.     
  The numbers reported are the 
weighted average rates, where the weighting was done by number of firm-years.  In the full 
sample, domestics and multinationals faced identical average statutory tax rates of 38%.   
 
4.  Results from Comparing Domestic-only Firms with Multinationals 
4.1. Actual vs. Estimated ETRs 
Table 2, Panel A presents the domestic-only ETRs, which are the COUNTRY coefficients 
from estimating equation (1).  Panel B presents the multinational ETRs, which are the sum of the 
COUNTRY and the COUNTRY*MN coefficients.   
                                                           
30 We use the combined corporate statutory tax rate calculated for the 30 OECD countries and available at 
www.oecd.org (Table II.1).  For the non-OECD countries in our sample, we use the maximum rate in data kindly 
provided by Kevin Hassett. 17 
 
The first column in Table 2 reports the actual ETRs from the financial statements.  The 
second column reports the ETRs from estimating equation (1).
31  There is little difference 
between the two columns.
32
 
  We infer from the similarity between the actual and estimated ETRs 
that the control variables (for industry, year and size) have little impact on the coefficients of 
interest.  This pattern holds throughout the paper, suggesting that the inferences drawn in this 
study would be similar whether we used the actual ETRs from the financial statements or the 
ETRs estimated in the regression.  For brevity, we will focus exclusively on the estimated ETRs 
in the remainder of the paper. 
4.2. Comparing the tax burdens of domestic-only firms across countries 
The ETRs in Table 2, Panel A enable us to compare the tax burdens of domestic-only 
firms across countries.  The estimated regression coefficients for the domestic-only ETRs (in the 
second column) range from 10% (Middle East) to 39% (Japan) with mean (median) [standard 
deviation] of 24% (24%) [6%].  The Tax Havens (17%) are the only other group with a domestic 
ETR under 20%.  Japan (39%) is the only country with a domestic ETR above 27%.  Throughout 
the study this pattern reappears—the Middle East and usually the Tax Havens will have the 
lowest ETRs, and Japan’s ETR will far exceed any other country’s ETR.   
The domestic ETR for the U.S. is 26%, which is above the worldwide average, the same 
as those for the UK and France, and a percentage point less than those for Germany and Europe 
                                                           
31 To illustrate, for Canadian companies, Panel A shows that the mean actual ETR from the financial statements for 
domestic-only firms is 22%, while the estimated ETR for domestics is 23%.  Panel B shows that the multinational 
actual ETR from the financial statement is 26% and the estimated multinational ETR is 24%. 
32 The actual domestic ETRs in Panel A average 0.4 percentage points more than the domestic estimated ETRs.  The 
largest spread in absolute value is 3.1 percentage points for Japan.  More importantly, for purposes of comparing 
countries, the rank order of the two ETRs columns is nearly identical with a Pearson coefficient of 99%.  With the 
multinationals in Panel B, the actual ETRs average 2.1 percentage points more than the estimated multinational 
ETRs.  The largest spread in absolute value is 3.9 percentage points for Africa.  The Pearson correlation coefficient 
is 99%. 18 
 
(i.e., the remaining European countries, which are grouped together).  This order will hold 
throughout the study, i.e., the U.S. domestic ETR will be above average, similar to those of the 
UK and European countries, but well below that of Japan.  Furthermore, ignoring Japan’s high 
rates, the Asian ETRs will be less than the American and European ETRs.  In fact, all of the 
domestic ETRs for France, Germany, the UK, the U.S., and Europe will exceed those for China, 
India, the Asian Tigers, and Asia (i.e., the remaining Asian countries) for most of the tests in the 
paper.  
 
4.3. Comparing the tax burdens of multinationals across countries 
The ETRs in Table 2, Panel B enable us to compare the tax burdens of multinationals 
across countries.  The mean (median) [standard deviation] of the multinational ETRs in the 
second column are 22% (23%) [6%].  As with the domestic ETRs, the Middle East (11%) and 
Japan (36%) have the most extreme ETRs.  The Tax Havens (15%), China (17%), Asian Tigers 
(17%), and India (18%) also are under 20%. Germany (30%) has the second highest 
multinational ETR.  The U.S. multinational ETR follows at 27%.  Once again, the U.S. finds 
itself with an above-average ETR and bracketed by its European trading partners with the next 
highest ETRs coming from the UK (26%), France (25%) and Europe (24%).  As with the 
domestic ETRs, the multinational ETRs for France, Germany, the UK, the U.S., and the 
remaining European countries exceed those for China, India, the Asian Tigers, and the remaining 
Asian countries (excluding Japan).  We infer that the general rankings from high-tax countries to 
low-tax countries are qualitatively the same for domestics and multinationals.  
 The difference between the percentages in Panel B and those in Panel A (which is the 
coefficient on COUNTRY*MN) is the amount by which the multinational ETRs exceed the 19 
 
domestic ETRs.  The mean (median) [standard deviation] for the difference is -1% (-2%) [2%].  
This indicates that the multinationals average slightly lower ETRs than their domestic-only 
counterparts face.   
Interestingly, four of the five groups whose domestics face statistically significant (at the 
0.05 level) higher ETRs compared with their multinational counterparts are Asian (India (5%), 
China (4%), Asian Tigers (3%) and Japan (3%)).
33
 
   The other one is Europe (3%).  The U.S. is 
the only country whose multinational ETR is significantly greater than its domestic ETR.  
However, the difference is only 1%, leading us to conclude that American domestics and 
multinationals face similar ETRs.  
4.4. Comparisons using the Current Income Tax Expense 
The numerator in our computation of ETR, the total income tax expense, is the tax 
expense on current profits, regardless of whether those taxes were paid in the past, are paid in the 
current year, or will be paid in the future.  The current income tax expense includes only that 
portion of the total income tax expense related to taxes that will be paid in the current year.  
Thus, current income tax expense should be a better numerator than total income tax expense for 
our measure of ETRs.
34
Unfortunately, Osiris does not collect the current income tax expense.  However, 
Compustat Global does collect it.  Thus, to test the sensitivity of our inferences to the use of the 
total income tax expense, we merge the Osiris and Compustat Global databases to create a 
   
                                                           
33 A possible explanation for the lower ETR of Indian multinationals as compared to Indian domestic-only firms is 
that India has granted extended tax holidays to software firms over our sample period.  19% of the Indian firm-years 
in our sample are in the Computer Programming industry (NAICS 5415).  All other industries, except Biotech 
Manufacturing (NAICS 3254) at 12%, represent less than 5% of the sample.  We thank Mihir Desai for bringing this 
information to our attention.  We look forward to future research that details similarly rich industry-level differences 
that explain some of the differences in the domestic and multinational ETRs of other countries. 
34 See Hanlon (2003) for a detailed discussion of both the total and current income tax expenses and problems 
associated with using either of them to approximate actual taxes paid. 20 
 
matched sample of 9,185 firm-years from 2003-2007 for whom data are available in both 
databases.
35  We then estimate equation (1) using the matched sample and the current income tax 
expense.  The regression coefficient estimates for COUNTRY and COUNTRY*MN will enable us 
to compare domestic and multinational ETRs across countries and within countries and thus 
assess whether the inferences, reached using the total income tax expense, hold when we use the 
current income tax expense.
36
The third column in Table 2 shows the estimated ETRs using the current income tax 
expense and the matched sample.  A limitation of the smaller, matched sample is that we have 
insufficient observations for some countries, e.g., we have only one domestic African firm-year 
that reports a current income tax expense.  Thus, we do not report an estimated domestic ETR for 
Africa or any other domestic or multinational cell with fewer than 20 observations.  This 
eliminates domestic and multinational estimated ETRs for Canada and domestic estimated ETRs 
for France, India, the Tax Havens, Africa and the Middle East, leaving nine (15) domestic 
(multinational) ETRs. 
   
                                                           
35 The matched sample is smaller for several reasons.  First, Compustat Global may track different companies from 
those tracked by Osiris.  Second, the only firm identifier common to the two databases is the firm name.  Slight 
variations in the name (e.g., Inc. versus Incorporated) may result in matches being overlooked.  Last, an inordinate 
number of European firms erroneously show zero current tax expense in 2005 and 2006.  Compustat Global has 
acknowledged this error but has not corrected it.  Consequently, we drop all firm-years from the problematic 
countries from our sample. Compustat Global has another shortcoming for purposes of this study.  In particular, it 
has no foreign subsidiary information.  The only item in the Compustat Global database that indicates any foreign 
activity is foreign tax expense.  Unfortunately, accounting rules vary across countries in the reporting of foreign 
income tax expense, rendering cross-country comparisons based on foreign tax expense problematic.  In addition, no 
foreign income tax expense will be reported by companies that owe no foreign tax, even if they have extensive 
foreign activities.  To illustrate this shortcoming, 678 (30%) of the 2,276 firm-years in our matched sample in 2006 
(the year in which we have the most confidence in our procedure for identifying multinationals using Osiris data) are 
classified differently (and we believe erroneously) when we rely on the presence of foreign income tax expense in 
Compustat Global to identify multinationals. 
36 To establish comparability between the two samples, we first estimate equation (1) with the smaller, matched 
sample, but continuing to use the total income tax expense in the numerator of the ETR measure.  We find that the 
inferences drawn from this regression are similar to the ones drawn from the full sample using total income tax 
expense.  This provides confidence that any difference between the findings using total income tax expense in the 
numerator and those using current income tax expense in the numerator does not arise from sample differences. 21 
 
We find that our high-tax to low-tax rankings are largely indifferent to whether the ETR 
numerator is total or current income tax expense.
37
In summary, the ETRs and the relative rank of the countries are largely unaffected by 
whether the numerator in the ETR calculation is total income tax expense or current income tax 
expense.  Thus, for the remainder of this paper, we will use the sample with total income tax 
expense as the numerator because it triples the sample that uses the current income tax expense. 
  Japan’s current domestic (multinational) 
ETR remains substantially higher than any other country’s ETR at 38% (35%).  The group with 
the next highest ETR is Europe (Germany) at 32% (30%).  With no domestic estimates for the 
Middle East or Tax Havens, the Asian Tigers and Latin America share the lowest domestic ETR 
at 17%.  China has the lowest multinational ETR (14%).  Ignoring Japan, all of the Asian ETRs 
continue to be less than the American and European ETRs.   
 
4.5. Comparisons using all Firm-Years from 1988-2007 
As discussed above, we exclude pre-2003 firm-years because the Osiris foreign 
subsidiary information, which we use to identify multinationals, is only coded for the most recent 
Osiris update.  Since we do not know when a firm formed its first foreign subsidiary, using all 
firm-years undoubtedly results in miscoding some domestic-only firm-years as multinational 
firm-years. 
To find out if this miscoding of firm-years before 2003 affects the high-tax to low-tax 
ranking among the countries in our study, we estimate equation (1) including all firm-years for 
which we have data.  This adds 41,737 firm-years to our sample.  The last column in Table 2 
shows the resulting estimated ETRs. 
                                                           
37 Consistent with deferred tax liabilities generally exceeding deferred tax assets, the coefficient estimates for the 
ETRs computed with total income tax expense in the numerator exceed the coefficient estimates for the ETRs 
computed with current income tax expense in the numerator in 20 of the 25 cases in the third column of Table 2.  22 
 
Despite this substantial increase in observations and the inevitable miscoding of 
multinationals introduced by adding the earlier firm-years and the potential survivorship bias 
noted above, the inferences are largely unaltered.  The rank order of the countries remains 
qualitatively unaltered: the Japanese domestic (multinational) ETR is 38% (37%), nine (five) 
percentage points greater than that for France (Germany), the country with next highest ETR.  
The domestic (multinational) Middle Eastern ETR is the lowest at 11% (12%), seven (two) 
percentage points below those of China and Latin America (Tax Havens).  Once again, the U.S. 
and European countries generally have higher ETRs than Asian countries.  All of the domestic 
and multinational ETRs for France, Germany, the UK, the U.S., and Europe exceed those for 
China, India, the Asian Tigers, and Asia.  In short, the high-tax to low-tax rankings are 
substantially the same from 1988 to 2007 as they are from 2003 to 2007.     
 
4.6. Year-by-year comparisons from 1988 to 2007 
The previous section establishes that the estimates of equation (1) are substantially the 
same whether the sample is drawn from recent years (2003-2007) or from the entire investigation 
period (1988-2007).  In this section we report annual estimated ETRs, using the complete sample 
of firm-years to estimate equation (1) for each year.  These estimated regression coefficients 
enable us to analyze the changes in ETRs over time for each country. 
Table 3 reports the annual estimated domestic and multinational ETRs.  Percentages are 
only presented if there are at least 20 observations, but all available firm-years were included in 
the regressions.   
We find that the high-tax to low-tax rank across countries has changed little over the two 
decades.  The order in 1988 (the first year) is similar to the rank in 2006 (the final year with data 23 
 
for all groups).  In 1988, the Japanese multinational ETR was the highest at 49% (15 percentage 
points ahead of any other country); in 2006, they were the highest at 36% (nine percentage points 
higher than those from any other country).  In fact, although their rates declined significantly 
over time, in every year Japanese domestic and multinational ETRs were higher than those in 
any country (note that we report no estimates for Japanese domestics before 1993 because in 
these earlier years we do not have at least 20 Japanese domestic observations in a single year).
38
In 1988, the Tax Havens enjoyed the lowest multinational ETR.  Since then, they have 
averaged three percentage points above the minimum ETR.  The Middle East has had the lowest 
domestic (multinational) ETRs since 2000 (1999).  From 1997 to 2000, India enjoyed the lowest 
multinational ETRs.  
     
The U.S. and European countries always had higher ETRs than the Asian countries, with 
the notable exception of Japan.  In 1998 (the first year with data for all Asian countries), the 
multinational ETRs of France, Germany, the UK, the U.S., and Europe averaged 29%.  The 
multinational ETRs of China, India, Asian Tigers, and Asia averaged 15%.  In 2006, those same 
Western countries bested their same Eastern counterparts 25% to 18%.   
Over the two decades, German multinational ETRs fell more than any other country’s 
multinational ETRs.  In 1989 they approached Japanese levels in 1989 at 47%.  By 2006 they 
had tumbled to 27% (although still five percentage points above average).  Two other countries 
with large declines were Japanese multinationals from 49% in 1988 to 36% in 2006 and 
Australian multinationals from 34% in 1988 to 23% in 2006.  U.S. ETR declines were modest: 
                                                           
38 Though beyond the scope of this study, Japan’s remarkable ability to sustain substantially higher tax rates than its 
trading partners throughout two decades warrants further investigation.  Ishi (2001) and Griffith and Klemm (2004) 
(among others) document the gap, but we are aware of no study that attempts to ascertain the reasons why the gap 
has persisted for such a long period. 24 
 
domestic (multinational) ETRs dropped by only two (two) percentage points.
39
Interestingly, the ETR declines had a precipitous drop from 1992 to 1994.  During those 
two years, German multinational ETRs fell 14 percentage points.  Australian multinational ETRs 
tumbled 11 percentage points.  Japanese multinational ETRs dropped 6 percentage points.  The 
decrease was permanent.  ETRs for those three groups never rebounded to their 1992 levels.  
From 2002 to 2003, the ETRs for Canadian domestics dropped from 31% to 22% and 
multinationals from 27% to 21%.  Neither Canadian group has seen its ETR return to its earlier 
level.   
  For the ten 
groups for which we have data from 1989 to 2006 (British and American domestics and 
multinationals and Australian, French, German, Japanese, Tax Haven and European 
multinationals), the average decline over the period was 7 percentage points or 20% of their 1989 
ETRs.  
The only country that showed a substantial increase in ETRs is India, where multinational 
ETRs jumped from 8% in 2000 to 20% in 2002 and have remained at roughly that level.  The 
Europe multinational ETRs remained steady over time.  They were 22% in 1989, even lower 
than the Tax Havens’ multinational ETR, but because of the dramatic declines in other countries’ 
ETRs, they were slightly above average by 1999.  All other groups had lower ETRs in 2006 than 
in 1988.   
 
4.7.  Comparisons Across Industries 
To assess whether ETRs vary across industries, we estimate equation (1) using industry 
groupings.  We form the industries using two-digit NAICS codes and the 2003-2007 sample with 
                                                           
39 These findings are consistent with those of the 2008 study by the OECD discussed in Hodge (2008) which 
documented that 2008 was the seventeenth consecutive year in which the average statutory corporate tax rate in non-
U.S. OECD countries fell while the U.S. rate remained unchanged. 25 
 
total income tax expense in the numerator.  We group two-digit codes to ensure that each 
reported industry has at least 900 firm-years.  All observations are included in the regressions, 
but only cells with twenty or more observations are reported.  Manufacturers comprise 49% of 
the firm-years. 
Table 4 shows the resulting ETR estimates.  The rank order of the countries is consistent 
across industries.  For every industry in which they have enough observations, Japanese ETRs 
remain higher and Middle Eastern ETRs lower than those from any other country.  The U.S. and 
European countries continue to have higher ETRs than Asian ETRs (once again, ignoring Japan).   
Within-country comparisons reveal substantial variation in most countries/groups, with 
an average range (standard deviation) in ETRs of 14 (five) percentage points.  The Retail Trade 
industry has the highest ETRs.  Combining domestic and multinational estimates, the Retail 
Trade ETRs are highest for 13 of the 17 countries/groups that reported Retail Trade ETRs.  The 
U.S. Retail Trade ETR is 34% (35%) for domestics (multinationals), six percentage points higher 
than those of the next industry, Manufacturing (Real Estate).   
The Information and Professional industries have the lowest multinational ETRs.  Six 
(four) of the ten (eleven) countries/groups that report a multinational ETR in the Information 
(Professional) industry report their lowest ETR in that industry.  The domestic ETRs exhibit no 
similar pattern.  The U.S. Financial (Information) industry has the lowest domestic 
(multinational) ETR of 15% (17%), four (two) percentage points less than the Information 
(Professional) industry ETR. 
 
4.8. Additional Tests 
The data enable us to conduct a battery of additional tests and robustness checks, which 
we discuss briefly in this section.  In every case, the inferences drawn above hold.   26 
 
One, it is difficult to determine where the profits generated from intangible assets are 
earned.  As a result, firms with large amounts of intangible assets may be better able to avoid 
taxes (see discussions in Huizinga, Laeven and Nicodeme, 2008, Mutti and Grubert, 2007, and 
Desai, Foley and Hines, 2006, among many others).  To assess whether firms with greater 
amounts of intangibles have lower ETRs, we would ideally sort firms based on their levels of 
intangible assets.  Unfortunately, information about the amount of intangible assets is not 
publicly available.  Thus, we turn to an observable figure, total research and development 
expenses, which, we assume, is positively correlated with the firm’s level of intangibles.   
We estimate equation (1) for those firm-years with positive values for research and 
development expenses, modifying the equation to include a categorical variable for those firm-
years where research and development expenses as a percentage of total assets are above the 
median.  Consistent with high intangible firms having lower ETRs, we find that the coefficient 
on the categorical variable is -2.6% and highly significant.  
Two, as mentioned above, many countries have shifted from a worldwide tax system to a 
territorial tax system.  Furthermore, Japan and the U.K. are in the process of moving to a 
territorial system, leaving the U.S. as the sole remaining major worldwide country.  Some have 
conjectured that a territorial system in the U.S. would collect less revenue than the current 
worldwide system.  To test the impact of a worldwide system on ETRs, we estimate equation (1), 
after adding a categorical variable equal to one if the parent country has a worldwide tax system, 
and zero otherwise.  We find that the worldwide coefficient is insignificant.     
Three, in countries with imputation, the corporate income tax serves as a form of 
withholding tax because the corporate tax (or some part of it) can be used to offset shareholders’ 
dividend taxes.  Thus, it is possible that corporate tax planning is less important in imputation 27 
 
countries because firms in those countries have less incentive to lower their ETRs than those do 
in classical systems, such as the U.S., where corporate taxes do not offset shareholder taxes.  We 
test this possibility by modifying equation (1) to include a categorical variable that indicates 
whether the firm is domiciled in a country with any form of imputation.  We find that the 
estimated coefficient on the imputation variable is 6% and significant at the 1% level, consistent 
with imputation countries facing higher ETRs.  
Four, to assess the impact of cross-country differences in book and tax accounting on our 
estimates of cross-country ETRs, we use Atwood, Drake and Myers’ (2009) book-tax conformity 
measure (BTC) for 33 countries from 1993 to 2005.  Consistent with book-tax conformity 
mattering, we find a positive correlation between BTC and the absolute value of the difference 
between a firm’s maximum statutory tax rate and its ETR.  However, when we modify equation 
(1) to include the BTC measure, we find that the coefficient on the BTC measure is insignificant.  
This failure to detect a relation between a measure of book-tax conformity and the level of ETRs 
provides some comfort that the inferences drawn from this study are not solely an artifact of 
cross-country differences in financial reporting. 
Five, another cross-country difference is whether tax losses can be carried back to offset 
the prior year’s taxable income.
40  When we add a categorical variable indicating whether a 
country permits losses to be carried back, we find that the coefficient on that variable is -2.5% 
and significant at the 0.01 level, which is consistent with lower ETRs in countries that permit 
firms to carry back their losses.
41
                                                           
40 This information is obtained from International Tax Summaries prepared by Deloitte and available through its 
website. 
 
41 We conduct no tests concerning the carryforward of losses because Estonia is the only country that does not 
permit them. 28 
 
Six, the corporate income tax is only one of many taxes, and in many countries, it is a 
relatively minor source of government revenue.  To the extent countries rely on alternative taxes, 
they may need less revenue from corporate income taxes, which are the sole tax used to compute 
ETRs.  Alternatively, high income tax countries may levy high taxes across the board.  
Consistent with a trade-off among revenue sources, we find that the value-added tax rate is 
negatively correlated with ETRs.
42
Seven, we include the maximum statutory corporate income tax rate in equation (1).  As 
would be expected, we find a positive coefficient on the statutory rate.  However, the relative 
ranks of the sixteen countries/groups’ multinationals, remain largely unchanged with Japan 
(Middle East) retaining the top (bottom) rank.  This implies that the ETRs are driven by 
differences in both tax rates and tax bases.   
  However, when we exclude companies domiciled in the U.S. 
(the only major country without a value-added tax), the correlation becomes positive, consistent 
with countries that have high corporate income taxes also having high value-added taxes.  To 
determine whether the value-added tax affects the inferences drawn above, we include the value-
added tax rate in equation (1).  Inferences are unaltered.   
Eight, the sample excludes all firm-years with losses (i.e., negative NIBT).  In this 
sensitivity test, we add back the 3,297 firm-years with losses and actual ETRs (from the financial 
statements) that equal zero and estimate equation (1).  By definition, adding these loss firm-years 
lowers the estimated ETRs.  We find that the inclusion of loss firm-years has inconsequential 
impact on the relative high-tax to low-tax rank across the countries: Japanese domestic 
(multinational) ETRs remain the highest by far at 31% (26%), ten (five) percentage points above 
the German ETRs.  The domestic (multinational) Middle Eastern ETRs are the lowest at 5% 
(4%), five (three) percentage points below the Tax Havens.  All of the multinational ETRs for 
                                                           
42 We thank Kevin Hassett for providing us with the valued-add tax data. 29 
 
France, Germany, the UK, the U.S., and Europe exceed those for China, India, and the Asian 
Tigers.   
Nine, the sample includes firm-years with zero ETRs as long as their NIBT was positive.  
In this robustness check, we drop those 1,058 firm-years with non-positive ETRs as reported in 
the financial statements.  By definition, eliminating these zero ETR firms increases the estimated 
ETRs.  We find that the deletion of non-positive ETRs has inconsequential impact on the relative 
high-tax to low-tax rank across the countries: Japanese domestic (multinational) ETRs are 40% 
(38%), twelve (six) percentage points above those for Germany, the country with the next 
highest ETR.  The domestic (multinational) Middle Eastern ETRs are the lowest at 12% (13%), 
eight (four) percentage points ahead of the Tax Havens.  Once again, the U.S. and European 
countries generally have higher ETRs than Asian countries.  All of the domestic and 
multinational ETRs for France, Germany, the UK, the U.S., and Europe exceed those for China, 
India, the Asian Tigers, and Asia.   
All in all, we conclude from this series of additional tests that the earlier inferences about 
ETRs hold.  The remainder of the paper expands the domestic-multinational dichotomy to 
consider whether the domiciles of foreign subsidiaries affect ETRs.  
 
5.  Results from Comparing Foreign Subsidiaries 
5.1. Cross-country comparisons 
In Equation (1), we use the presence of a foreign subsidiary to distinguish multinationals 
from domestic-only firms.  In this section, we replace that single categorical variable with 
categorical variables for all locations of foreign subsidiaries.  The coefficients on the foreign 30 
 
subsidiary variables enable us to assess the extent to which the location of a foreign subsidiary 
affects the tax burdens of its parent.  The regression equation is:   
 
 
where:   an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i reports a subsidiary in country 
k, equal to 0 otherwise. 
All other variables are defined the same as in equation (1).  The estimated regression coefficient 
on SUB is the estimated impact on ETRs arising from having a subsidiary in that foreign country.   
We continue to use the same 16 groups as in the previous section.  Each group serves as a 
COUNTRY variable and a SUB variable.  Each firm-year has one country in which its COUNTRY 
variable is coded one.  However, it has n SUBs coded one, where n is the number of different 
countries in which the parent has at least one subsidiary.
43
We begin with the original sample of 27,136 firm-years (from 2003-2007) with total 
income tax expense as the numerator for the ETR.  We lose 167 firm-years whose companies 
indicated that they had a foreign subsidiary (which was adequate for coding it as a multinational 
in estimating equation (1)), but did not specify the location of the foreign subsidiary, rendering it 
unusable for estimating equation (2).  For these remaining 26,969 firm-years, there are 57,966 
SUB variables with a value of one.  All 16 subsidiary locations have at least 1,200 firm-years.  
Europe is the most popular location for foreign subsidiaries with 6,335 firm-years.    
 
Table 5 shows the regression coefficient estimates for COUNTRY in Panel A and SUB in 
Panel B.  The COUNTRY coefficients from equation (2) should be the same as the COUNTRY 
                                                           
43 For example, if a U.S. parent has subsidiaries in Canada, Germany, and Bermuda,  ,  , 
, and   would be coded one, while all other   and   variables would be 
coded zero. 31 
 
coefficients from equation (1), except to the extent that identifying the location of a firm’s 
foreign subsidiaries, as opposed to just identifying the existence of a foreign subsidiary provides 
information.  It seems plausible that knowing the subsidiary’s domicile would affect inferences 
because foreign subsidiaries are not randomly distributed across parents.  Multinationals from 
some countries might be more likely to have profitable foreign investments or operate in high-tax 
countries (e.g., French companies are more likely to have a subsidiary in high-tax Germany than 
are Indian companies, which might account for some of the higher ETRs in France.).  That said, 
we find little evidence that the location of the foreign subsidiary matters.  Only two COUNTRY 
coefficients are more than two percentage points different from the corresponding COUNTRY 
coefficients in Table 2.  The domestic German ETR decreases from 30% to 27%, while the 
domestic Indian ETR increases from 20% to 23%.  
We now turn our attention to Panel B and the SUB coefficients.  We expect cross-country 
variation in the SUB coefficients to the extent that locating a foreign subsidiary in a country 
affects the multinational’s ETR.  For example, if a firm can shift profits from a high-tax country 
to a tax haven, then its ETR should be lower and the Tax Haven SUB coefficient should reflect 
those tax savings.  To our surprise, we find little evidence of cross-country variation in SUB 
coefficients.  The SUB coefficients range from a 1.3 percentage points decrease in ETRs (Asia) 
to a 1.2 percentage points increase in ETRs (Australia).  The Tax Haven SUB coefficient implies 
that a firm with at least one subsidiary in a haven country enjoys a 0.5 percentage point lower 
ETR, negative but hardly a substantial amount.   
 
5.2. Parent-subsidiary interactions 
The lack of results in the previous section may stem from the fact that foreign 
subsidiaries affect the ETRs of their parents differently depending on the domicile of the parent.  32 
 
For example, Australian subsidiaries may lower the high-tax ETRs of Japan parents but increase 
the low-tax ETRs of Asian Tiger parents.  In the prior section, the two effects of Australian 
subsidiaries would have offset each other, potentially understating the impact of Australian 
subsidiaries on parent ETRs in both Japan and the Asian Tigers.   
In this section, we alter the research design in an attempt to detect any possible parent-
subsidiary interactive effects.  Specifically, we modify equation (2) by replacing the SUB 
variables with interactions between the COUNTRY and SUB variables.  We then compare the 
coefficients on the interactions to assess the extent to which subsidiaries affect parents 
differently, depending on whether the parent is in a high-tax or low-tax country.     
 
 
Table 6, Panel A presents the estimated interaction coefficients (no coefficients are 
shown unless there are at least 100 observations in a cell).  We would expect that subsidiaries in 
low-tax countries would lower the ETRs of their parents more than subsidiaries in high-tax 
countries do.  Consistent with this expectations, we find that, across all parents, the subsidiaries 
from low-tax countries (China, India, Asian Tigers, Tax Havens, Asian and the Middle East) 
have 30 negative interaction coefficients (indicating a reduction in the parents’ ETRs) and only 
nine positive interaction coefficients (indicating an increase in the parents’ ETRs).  For example, 
subsidiaries in Tax Havens reduce ETRs in 7 of the 8 countries with coefficients.  Conversely, 
subsidiaries located in high-tax countries (France, Germany, Japan, the UK, the U.S., and 
Europe) have 23 negative interaction coefficients and 26 positive interaction coefficients.   
The interactive coefficient estimates also allow us to compare domestics in a country 
with multinationals operating in that country, shedding light on reports, such as the U.S. 33 
 
Government Accountability Office’s (2008) finding that U.S.-controlled U.S. companies pay 
more taxes than foreign-controlled U.S. companies.  Consistent with the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office’s (2008) report, we find that U.S. domestics have a higher ETR (26%) 
than multinationals from every country, except Japan.
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We find a modest -0.1% coefficient on the Tax Haven subsidiaries of U.S. parents, which 
is less than Dyreng and Lindsey’s (2009) 1.5% estimate, computed using different data and 
methodology.  Nonetheless, both estimates imply that the impact of tax havens on U.S. parents' 
ETRs is not as substantial as might be implied by some political claims that vast sums of tax 
revenue are being lost through havens.   
  We also find that domestics in China, 
India, and the Asian Tigers face lower ETRs than multinationals from all Western countries. 
One explanation for both studies’ surprisingly low tax haven estimates is that foreign 
subsidiaries cluster and thus coefficients cannot be interpreted independently.  For examples, if 
tax havens are always paired with subsidiaries in high-tax locations (e.g., Irish subsidiaries 
always co-exist with high-tax European subsidiaries), then clustering effects among subsidiaries 
may understate the importance of tax havens because the tax haven coefficients are capturing 
some of the high-tax countries’ impact on ETRs. 
Thorough investigation of the potential effects of clustering on the ETR estimates in this 
study is beyond the scope of this paper.  However, as exploratory work, we augment equation (3) 
with three-way interaction terms.  Because of a limited number of observations, we include only 
three-way interactions that have as the parent country one of the five groups with the most firm-
years (Japan, the UK, the U.S., Asian Tigers, and Europe).  
                                                           
44 To compute the multinational rate, take the domestic ETR and adjust it for the effect of a U.S. subsidiary.  For 
example, the table shows that the Australian domestic ETR is 24% and the Australian parent-U.S. subsidiary is        -
1.9%.  Thus, Australian companies with U.S. subsidiaries have an average ETR of 22.1%, compared with an 




Panel B of Table 6 reports the estimates of   (the coefficient on the two-way 
interactions) for each of the five countries/groups from estimating equation (4) on the full 
sample.  Our hope is that controlling for three-way interactions will result in more precise two-
way interactions.  Comparing the estimates in Panel B to those in Panel A, we find that the sign 
of the two-way interaction coefficients remain the same in 45 of the 54 coefficients.  However, 
some of the coefficients change enough to suggest that controlling for three-way interactions 
affects the inferences drawn on the two-way interactions.   For example, the coefficient on Tax 
Haven subsidiaries of U.S. parents (-0.1% in Panel A) decreases to -0.7% in Panel B, providing 
stronger evidence that tax havens reduce the ETRs of U.S. multinationals even though the 
amount remains small.   
Ideally, additional interactions (i.e., four-way, five-way, and so forth) would be included 
in the regression model.  However, insufficient observations limit the extent of such interactions.  
We look forward to future work that attempts to grapple with the clustering of foreign 
subsidiaries and their impact on ETRs.   
 
6.  Closing Remarks 
To our knowledge, this paper provides the most comprehensive analysis of international 
firm-level corporate income tax expenses to date.  Its findings should aid the development of tax 
policy by quantifying the effective tax rates faced by multinational corporations around the 
globe.  The ETRs provide an empirical foundation for the heated debates about the taxes paid by 35 
 
multinationals and domestics around the world and should help to balance rhetoric with 
documented empirical facts.    
Our primary findings are: 
•  Multinationals and domestic-only firms face similar ETRs;   
•  Japan consistently has much higher ETRs than any other country;   
•  The U.S. has above-average ETRs;  
•  Tax havens, and Middle Eastern, and Asian countries (excepting Japan) have 
below-average ETRs. 
•  ETRs fell worldwide over the last two decades; 
•  The average decline in ETRs was about seven percentage points or 20%.   
•  German, Japanese, Australian and Canadian ETRs fell more than American, 
British, and French ETRs.   
•  The ordinal rank from high-tax countries to low-tax countries remained 
remarkably constant because all countries reduced their tax burdens. 
On this last point, further work is warranted to understand how the tax order of countries 
has remained so steady over two decades of radical worldwide changes in tax policy, financial 
reporting, economic development, law, politics, technology, and many other areas.  Although tax 
rates have fallen dramatically over the last 20 years, high-tax countries remain high-tax and low-
tax countries remain low-tax.  Perhaps globalization permits countries to change their tax 
systems but forces a herding effect because tax changes in one country reverberate around the 
globe (see Griffith and Klemm (2005) for a discussion of tax competition among OECD 
countries).  If this is the case, then proposed major international tax changes that would run 36 
 
contrary to current tax policy (e.g., adopting a formula apportionment system in the European 
Union or eliminating deferral in the U.S.) may be impossible without worldwide coordination.   
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Table 1  - Sample 
 
This table presents the means of variables in the Osiris dataset for years 2003-2007.  All dollar figures are in millions of U.S. dollars. 
 n   Sales    Assets   Equity  
 Total 













Full sample Domestic 12,778     612        847        305      17        56        13        -      31      30      32      38     
Multinational 14,358     3,513     4,290     1,563    115      371      68        30       31      28      30      38     
AUSTRALIA Domestic 494         132        307        129      7          27        13        -      27      24      29      30     
Multinational 740         971        1,185     546      33        144      49        21       23      25      29      30     
CANADA Domestic 376         423        547        274      11        52        7          -      20      22      23      36     
Multinational 426         1,340     2,616     963      67        218      31        11       31      26      29      36     
CHINA Domestic 534         176        289        112      3          14        11        -      21      21      19      30     
Multinational 184         762        1,132     392      17        96        20        6         18      18      17      30     
FRANCE Domestic 44           62          290        157      3          32        14        -      8        25      31      35     
Multinational 333         8,340     10,275    3,204    276      815      241      119     34      28      30      35     
GERMANY Domestic 74           79          199        72        3          11        71        -      29      26      28      39     
Multinational 293         8,757     12,990    3,270    200      628      151      71       32      33      35      39     
INDIA Domestic 80           193        243        80        4          15        2          -      27      24      27      35     
Multinational 375         508        637        303      15        78        6          5         19      20      19      35     
JAPAN Domestic 3,929       642        715        262      14        35        7          -      40      42      43      40     
Multinational 2,497       3,875     4,534     1,642    96        252      42        13       38      39      40      40     
UNITED KINGDOM Domestic 749         419        730        279      16        61        41        -      27      26      29      30     
Multinational 1,314       3,340     3,580     1,295    135      426      99        25       32      28      29      30     
UNITED STATES Domestic 2,836       1,166     1,799     582      36        111      25        -      33      28      36      39     
Multinational 4,341       4,965     6,136     2,333    185      597      81        38       31      30      33      39     
ASIAN TIGERS Domestic 2,241       330        414        177      7          33        4          -      21      20      21      25     
Multinational 972         2,236     2,411     918      34        190      19        7         18      18      17      25     
TAX HAVENS Domestic 41           138        341        167      4          19        10        -      18      20      21      23     
Multinational 807         1,785     1,991     888      43        199      70        59       21      17      16      6       
AFRICA Domestic 128         665        753        379      40        128      5          -      31      27      29      30     
Multinational 178         1,807     1,438     550      57        202      44        20       28      27      29      30     
ASIA Domestic 451         146        254        119      6          24        2          -      24      22      22      28     
Multinational 167         356        656        206      9          39        19        7         27      22      22      28     
EUROPE Domestic 296         276        583        206      15        52        19        -      28      27      28      28     
Multinational 1,264       2,719     3,416     1,169    100      313      88        46       32      26      28      30     
LATIN AMERICA Domestic 323         1,029     1,296     513      46        161      7          -      28      26      27      29     
Multinational 167         1,912     2,492     974      59        259      18        4         23      26      26      29     
MIDDLE EAST Domestic 110         222        463        232      4          48        4          -      9        9        4        24     
Multinational 258         358        740        334      8          58        18        12       14      11      5        30     42 
 
Table 2   
Summary of results 
 
 
Column (1) reports the mean ETR for each country/group in the Osiris 2003-2007 sample, as shown in Table 1.  
Columns (2) – (4) present the results of estimating   on 
samples described in the column headings.  Panel A reports the estimate of   for each country/group.  Panel B reports the 
estimate of ( +  for each country/group.  All available observations were included in the estimation, but estimates are only 
reported for countries/groups having 20 or more observations. * indicates that  is statistically significant at the 5% level.


















































































































AdjR2 0.86        0.88        0.87       
N 27,136     9,185      68,873    
Mean Estimate Estimate Estimate
Panel A  - Domestic
AUSTRALIA 24          24          21          23         
CANADA 22          23          25         
CHINA 21          21          20          18         
FRANCE 25          26          29         
GERMANY 26          27          25          27         
INDIA 24          23          21         
JAPAN 42          39          38          38         
UNITED KINGDOM 26          26          24          23         
UNITED STATES 28          26          28          24         
ASIAN TIGERS 20          20          17          19         
TAX HAVENS 17          17          19         
AFRICA 27          25          21         
ASIA 22          22          22          22         
EUROPE 27          27          32          25         
LATIN AMERICA 26          24          17          18         
MIDDLE EAST 8            10          11         
Panel B  - Multinational
AUSTRALIA 25          23   23   23  
CANADA 26          24   25  
CHINA 18          17* 14* 15*
FRANCE 28          25   23   23*
GERMANY 33          30   30   32*
INDIA 20          18* 19* 15*
JAPAN 39          36* 35* 37*
UNITED KINGDOM 28          26   25   24  
UNITED STATES 30          27* 27* 26*
ASIAN TIGERS 18          17* 15   15*
TAX HAVENS 17          15   15   14*
AFRICA 26          23   23   19*
ASIA 23          22   19   20*
EUROPE 26          24* 24* 22*
LATIN AMERICA 25          22   23* 17  




























































Table 3  Yearly estimates 
 
Results of estimating   for each year in the sample described in Column (6) of Table 2.  Panel A reports 
the estimate of   for each country/group.  Panel B reports the estimate of ( +  for each country/group. Estimates are reported for country-years with 20 or more observations.   
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
AdjR2 0.90   0.90   0.90   0.89   0.89   0.89   0.89   0.89   0.88   0.88   0.88   0.87   0.87   0.87   0.86   0.86   0.85   0.86   0.85   0.86  
N 1,175    1,288    1,409    1,493    1,694    1,918    2,359    2,679    2,993    3,255    3,463    4,101    4,536    4,394    4,980    5,734    6,567    6,991    7,085    759      
Panel A - Domestic
AUSTRALIA 23       26       25       22       20       21       24       23       23      
CANADA 33       32       30       29       31       22       22       20       19      
CHINA 20       17       16       18       21       20       20       21       21      
FRANCE
GERMANY 25       23      
INDIA 19      
JAPAN 48       43       42       42       44       44       40       42       40       41       38       36       38       39       39      
UNITED KINGDOM 30       32       30       28       29       26       26       25       24       24       23       24       24       25       26       25       23       25       26       21      
UNITED STATES 28       27       27       26       27       25       25       25       25       26       27       26       26       25       26       24       24       25       26       24      
ASIAN TIGERS 32       26       26       24       21       22       21       21       21       21       18       18       19       18      
TAX HAVENS
AFRICA 18       18       24       24       23       25       24      
ASIA 30       30       28       30       25       13       23       26       25       21       22       20       22      
EUROPE 28       30       28       26       26       29       25       26       25      
LATIN AMERICA 16       17       14       13       9         13       15       15       21       23       23       25       22       23       24      
MIDDLE EAST 13       11       8         8         11       7         9        
Panel B - Multinational
AUSTRALIA 34       32       31       27       33       26       26       25       24       24       26       25       25       25       23       21       22       22       23       20      
CANADA 28       31       24       26       29       31       31       32       29       29       27       21       22       22       24      
CHINA 11       15       14       13       18       16       16       17       17      
FRANCE 27       29       26       25       26       22       22       23       23       28       29       28       26       27       26       24       23       23       25      
GERMANY 47       46       42       44       36       30       33       33       34       38       37       34       31       32       32       27       29       27      
INDIA 9         8         10       8         16       20       18       17       17       18      
JAPAN 49       50       47       45       49       45       43       41       41       42       44       39       37       38       38       34       33       33       36       39      
UNITED KINGDOM 28       29       28       27       28       24       25       24       25       25       25       24       27       27       29       26       24       25       25       23      
UNITED STATES 29       30       30       28       29       27       27       27       28       29       29       29       30       28       27       24       25       25       27       24      
ASIAN TIGERS 22       17       19       17       16       19       17       17       15       16       13       14       15       17      
TAX HAVENS 21       24       20       19       20       14       14       14       15       16       16       17       15       16       16       14       14       13       15      
AFRICA 23       14       20       21       20       19       21       23       22      
ASIA 24       22       22       22       21       14       19       20       23       23       20       21       20      
EUROPE 23       22       25       21       22       19       21       21       23       24       24       23       26       25       25       22       22       22       23      
LATIN AMERICA 18       18       19       14       14       12       13       16       18       18       22       22       19       20       23      
MIDDLE EAST 17       15       15       14       11       9         9         11      44 
 
Table 4  Industries 
 
 
Results of estimating   for each industry (two-digit NAICS 
numbers included in each group are included in parentheses) in the sample described in Column (2) of Table 2.  Panel A reports the 
estimate of   for each country/group.  Panel B reports the estimate of ( +  for each country/group. Estimates are reported for 
country-industries with 20 or more observations.   

































































































































































AdjR2 0.86    0.86    0.65    0.81    0.86    0.80    0.89    0.86    0.85    0.94    0.88   
N 27,136    964       1,181    1,499    13,265    988       4,252    1,743    945       1,376    923      
Panel A  - Domestic
AUSTRALIA 24      23      27      14      25      17      24      19      23      27      22     
CANADA 23      13      19      24      17      23     
CHINA 21      20      23      28      22     
FRANCE 26     
GERMANY 27     
INDIA 23      20     
JAPAN 39      36      36      35      38      41      36      40      44      39     
UNITED KINGDOM 26      21      26      21      25      26      24      26      27      25     
UNITED STATES 26      25      15      19      28      22      30      21      24      34      24     
ASIAN TIGERS 20      16      14      19      21      15      12      28      16     
TAX HAVENS 17     
AFRICA 25      28      24     
ASIA 22      23      19      22      20      24     
EUROPE 27      27      28      23      23     
LATIN AMERICA 24      25      27      21      24     
MIDDLE EAST 10      9        9        9       
Panel B  - Multinational
AUSTRALIA 23   19   24   17   24   13   27   22   15* 32* 22  
CANADA 24   13   17   24   17   23   19  
CHINA 17* 14* 19   28   31  
FRANCE 25   24   32   20  
GERMANY 30   24   31   28   17*
INDIA 18* 14   21   13* 6*
JAPAN 36* 31* 37   30* 35* 38* 31* 35* 44   35*
UNITED KINGDOM 26   19   31   18   25   23* 25   21   27   30   20  
UNITED STATES 27* 24   25* 17   26* 23   30   19   29* 35   28*
ASIAN TIGERS 17* 18   6   16* 19   16   16   24   11  
TAX HAVENS 15   12   9   15* 12   21   21  
AFRICA 23   23* 24   31  
ASIA 22   28   22   19   15   23  
EUROPE 24* 21   19   16* 24* 16   25   20   20   27* 21  
LATIN AMERICA 22   22   26   23   2*















































Table 5   




This table presents the results of estimating   on a subsample 
of the sample described in Table 1 for which we have necessary subsidiary information.  Panel A reports the estimate of 
 for each country/group.  Panel B reports the estimate of   for each country/group.
AdjR2 0.86         
N 26,969       
Panel A  - Parents
AUSTRALIA 24           
CANADA 24           
CHINA 20           
FRANCE 26           
GERMANY 30           
INDIA 20           
JAPAN 38           
UNITED KINGDOM 26           
UNITED STATES 27           
ASIAN TIGERS 19           
TAX HAVENS 17           
AFRICA 24           
ASIA 22           
EUROPE 25           
LATIN AMERICA 24           
MIDDLE EAST 11           
Panel B  - Subsidiaries
AUSTRALIA 1.2          
CANADA 0.5          
CHINA (0.6)         
FRANCE 0.8          
GERMANY (0.6)         
INDIA 0.4          
JAPAN (0.6)         
UNITED KINGDOM (0.0)         
UNITED STATES (1.1)         
ASIAN TIGERS (0.6)         
TAX HAVENS (0.5)         
AFRICA 0.8          
ASIA (1.3)         
EUROPE 0.4          
LATIN AMERICA (0.3)         
MIDDLE EAST (0.3)          
46 
 
Table 6  Interactions 
 
Panel A presents the results of estimating   on a subsample of the sample described in Table 
1 for which we have necessary subsidiary information.  Each cell reports the estimate of   for the interaction of the given parent and subsidiary variables.  For 
example, the estimate of  for the interaction term   is 0.2.  All interaction terms were included in the estimation, but 
estimates are only reported for cells with 100 or more observations. 
Panel B presents the results of estimating   on the 
same sample as in Panel A.  Only three-way interaction terms with one of the five countries listed in Panel B as the parent were included.  Each cell reports the estimate of   
for the interaction of the given parent and subsidiary variables.  All interaction terms were included in the estimation, but estimates are only reported for cells 

























































































































































AUSTRALIA 24        0.2       0.8       0.1       0.6       (1.9)      1.2       (2.3)      (1.7)      0.4       (0.2)     
CANADA 23        1.8       1.7      
CHINA 21        (2.9)     
FRANCE 26        5.3       3.0       2.7       0.8       (2.2)      (1.6)      (6.9)      (1.6)      (2.4)      (0.7)      (7.7)      3.9       3.1      
GERMANY 29        2.4       (2.6)      (3.1)      (0.1)      3.3      
INDIA 22        (1.2)      (6.0)      1.8      
JAPAN 39        (1.9)      (0.9)      0.1       2.1       (2.8)      (0.4)      0.1       (1.3)      (1.3)      1.4       (1.4)      (0.4)      (2.0)     
UNITED KINGDOM 26        2.4       (1.6)      (0.2)      1.2       0.3       3.1       (0.2)      (1.5)      (0.2)      (1.0)      0.7       (0.5)      0.9       (1.9)      (3.0)      
UNITED STATES 26        0.9       1.0       (1.6)      (0.0)      (0.6)      (0.5)      (2.5)      0.9       1.3       (0.1)      1.1       (1.6)      0.9       0.4       (0.7)      
ASIAN TIGERS 19        (1.2)      (1.0)      (1.5)      (2.7)      1.4       (3.6)      (0.7)      (3.0)      (1.4)     
TAX HAVENS 15        (2.2)      (2.3)      (0.0)      4.9       2.7       0.9       (0.6)      (0.8)      (0.9)      1.3       1.3       3.0       (0.4)     
EUROPE 25        (0.0)      (0.6)      (0.2)      (1.5)      1.1       (2.3)      0.9       0.9       0.9       (0.8)      (1.2)      (0.9)      (0.3)      0.3       2.8        
Panel B
JAPAN 39        (3.8)      (9.7)      1.2       3.8       (5.6)      (1.4)      (1.5)      (2.7)      6.7       (2.6)      1.7       (9.2)     
UNITED KINGDOM 26        7.6       (1.0)      (3.9)      (1.6)      (4.7)      (1.5)      (4.3)      (0.2)      5.2       3.5       (5.9)     
UNITED STATES 26        2.9       1.4       (4.3)      (1.7)      2.0       1.1       (3.1)      1.6       1.7       (0.7)      8.7       (0.1)      2.9       1.8       1.3        
ASIAN TIGERS 19        (3.9)      (2.4)      0.7       (3.7)      (5.0)     
EUROPE 26        (1.3)      (3.2)      1.1       (4.3)      1.4       1.5       0.5       (8.6)      (4.6)      29.3     3.4      